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 Shariah Governance: Challenges Ahead 
 
Ahmad Faizal Abdul Aziz1 
 
Abstract 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) had previously issued a number of statutory requirements 
in making the establishment of Shariah Committee (SC) of a bank mandatory via Islamic 
Banking Act 1983, Banking & Financial Institution Act 1989, Takaful Act 1984 and Central 
bank of Malaysia (Amendment) Act 2003. The establishment of SC is important as part of 
the governance of an Islamic Bank in order to  assure the stakeholders that the Bank is 
doing its business in permissible manner as outlined by the Shariah. Despite the structure, 
there is still skepticism about the system mainly on the capacity and the capability of the 
SC as reported in previous publications. This paper shall identify challenges faced by the SC 
that had impaired their capacity and capability in achieving their objectives. 
Subsequently, this paper shall recommend alternative measures on issues highlighted in 
assisting the SC and Shariah Auditors in bridging the public expectations. This study 
confines to issues pertaining to Islamic Banks operating in Malaysia as published in 
relevant articles and the author’s personal encounter.    
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are reasons to believe that there are certain numbers of people still skeptical 
about Islamic finance due to reasons that can be traced back to lack of strong 
governance. As reported by Karen Remo-Listana (2009), analyst unanimously said 
lack of credibility and innovation is hindering leapfrog growth of Islamic finance. This is 
due to the fact that the industry is still stuck within the conventional banking 
framework, whereby there is lack of effort in bringing it closer to a Shariah-based 
financing. It was further reported that a member of the Islamic Finance Council of 
United Kingdom and Executive Board Member of Ernst & Young, Omar Shaikh, (in 
Karen Remo-Listana 2009) said that public is still skeptical on the product whereby 
the Islamic financial products does not look as different as conventional products. 
Additionally, Parvez Ahmad (2010) cited findings in a research by Islamic 
Development Bank on the attitude of customers and bankers of Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFIs). He reported that 7 out of 10 do not see the difference between the 
profit rate and interest, and 7 out of 10 are unwilling to patronize IFIs because there is 
no difference with the conventional banks.   
 
Harbhajan Singh (2008) pointed out that some level of skepticism in Islamic finance in 
managing the trust of the stakeholders is seen despite tremendous growth. This is 
directly related to weak Shariah governance to instill strong trust to the Management 
and the Board of Directors.  In addition, credibility of Shariah scholars in moving 
towards better governance is discussed in detail by four international scholars namely 
Dr Hussain Hamid Hassan, Dr Mohammad Daud Bakar, Mr Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo and 
Dr Mohammad Akram Laldin in response to questions posted by Rushdi Siddiqui 
(2010).  
 
Lack of expertise in the industry had lead experienced scholars to be appointed as 
member of Shariah Board in many Islamic financial institutions (IFI) around the world. 
Experienced scholars become a brand name of their own and this had in turn made 
some IFIs to pursuit these scholars as their Shariah Supervisory Board member 
(Shariah Committee member in the case of Malaysia). Wilson (2009) reported that this 
practice had been a widely discussed topic and there had been concern of whether 
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sufficient time had been devoted to discharge their responsibilities in an effective 
manner. While some of this accusations may not be true, challenges in the industry due 
to lack of expertise had more or less tarnished the image of governance of Islamic 
finance.    
 
Finally, based on a survey by PricewaterhouseCoopers Malaysia that had been 
conducted on 15 Malaysian-based IFIs in 2010 (Mohammad Faiz Azmi 2011), the 
following were among the findings were noted: 
 30% disagree that there is sufficient number of staff to perform Shariah audit 
effectively; 
 40% disagree that Shariah audit staff are adequately trained in Shariah related 
audit risks and issues; 
 30% disagree that the scope of Shariah audits are comprehensive enough to 
cover all relevant processes in the bank; 
 70% said the Shariah scholars are not involved in the audit process; 
 50% said that the Shariah scholars does not review the audit report and does not 
follow up on queries with the management; and 
 Only 30% agrees that there is a dispute resolution process to allow the 
management to resolve potential conflicts with the Shariah scholars in a 
structured manner. 
 
It is apparent that while there is a lot that had been done by BNM to instill good Shariah 
governance in the IFIs, there are still a lot of rooms to be improved in order to provide 
assurance to the public. Public confidence is very important in order to propel the 
industry more rapidly. Based on the Shariah Governance Framework Model for IFIs 
issued by BNM, areas that is the most crucial is the function of Shariah Committee (SC) 
and the Shariah audit since these are the main support to ensure Shariah compliance. 
 
As such, the author took the initiative to further explore on the challenges faced by 
Shariah governance, particularly the Shariah Committee (SC) and the Shariah audit, 
which had lead to negative comments on the industry. The author shall complement his 
findings with practical solutions that would, Insya Allah improvise the concerns on 
Shariah governance.  
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This paper shall be structured in the following manner: The following section presents a 
literature review on the subject; and section 3 illustrates the concept of governance 
from Islam’s point of view. Section 4 will highlights areas of concern in the current 
Shariah governance; Section 5 provides some practical solutions on the issues; and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.0   LITERATURE REVIEW & METHODOLOGY 
 
In capitalism, the main purpose of an enterprise is to make profit. In other word, the 
creation of business is solely to maximize the shareholders’ wealth. In Islam however, 
the objective of a corporation is bigger than profit maximization or shareholders’ 
wealth maximization. While Islam recognizes property rights, it is not absolute to the 
shareholders unless the rights of the stakeholders are also protected (Zamir Iqbal & 
Abbas Mirakhor, 2004). According to Zulkifli Hasan (2009), this is resulting from the 
concept of corporate governance in Islam that is based on tawhid. 
 
Based on a research by Wafik Grais & Matteo Pellegrini (2006), currently Shariah 
compliance is relied upon internal structures particularly the Shariah Supervisory 
Board (or SC in Malaysia). SC face challenges of in terms of independency, lack of trust 
in handling confidential information of the institution, lack of scholars who are qualified 
in Shariah and finance and lack of consistency between their judgments. The said 
authors introduced collaboration between internal and external structure in order to 
reduce if not eliminate the issues while jointly achieving Shariah compliance. 
 
Nawal Kasim, Shahul Hameed Mohamed Ibrahim & Maliah Sulaiman (2009) 
focused on expectation gap in Shariah auditing. Their survey had posted four questions 
that had been the dilemma of Shariah audit namely, whether Shariah auditing 
framework differ from conventional, whether scope of Shariah auditing is broader than 
conventional, whether Shariah auditor specialized in Shariah and accounting and 
whether Shariah auditor is independent from the organisation. They noted a gap 
whereby Shariah auditing was not seriously taken in Malaysian IFIs, calling for crucial 
development of comprehensive Shariah auditing framework. It was supported by an 
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article by Shahul Hameed Mohamed Ibrahim (2008) that had previously mentioned 
that Shariah auditing is an area waiting to be developed and concluded with a call for 
experts in both Shariah and auditing to jointly develop the framework. This joint effort 
shall benefit the whole of mankind in promoting human and environmental welfare.  
 
As a caution to the readers, this paper was not written based on extensive scientific 
research and employing rigorous methodology in concluding the findings. The author 
regrouped previous findings and added in his own observation on Shariah governance 
which was experienced during his days as an auditor of a local Islamic bank. While no 
current primary research had been conducted for this paper, it may somehow give loose 
and outdated remarks on his findings if it has been effectively corrected. 
 
3.0 SHARIAH GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 Corporate Governance in Islam 
 
Generally, corporate governance can be simply defined as a formal system of 
accountability of senior management to the shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). In 
a deeper term, corporate governance includes the entire network of formal and 
informal relations involving the corporate sector and their consequences towards the 
society in general (Mesnooh, 2002). As such, it is not only concern about the 
relationship between the senior management (as agent) and the shareholder (as the 
principal), but also covered a wider scope of principal i.e. the society at large. Therefore, 
anything that can be affected by the corporation should receive the custodianship of the 
corporate governance. 
 
The concept of corporate governance is actually embedded in Islam whereby the 
company’s movements towards achieving its objective is properly and systematically 
guided and controlled in order to meet and protect stakeholders’ rights and objectives. 
Nevertheless, the concept of stakeholder does not only limited to worldly forms but 
extended towards the concept of tawhid and the oneness of God (Choudury & Hoque, 
2004). 
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Under the concept of tawhid, one does not only answerable or responsible towards 
another living being but also to the higher authority, Allah. In the Quran, Allah made it 
clear via the following verse (Quran 2:139) among others that we are accountable of 
whatever we did. 
 
Say: Will ye dispute with us about Allah, seeing that He is our Lord and your 
Lord; that we are responsible for our doings and ye for yours; and that We are 
sincere (in our faith) in Him? 
(Quran 2:139) 
 
As everyone is expected to perform their part of the deal as a stakeholder, it can be 
further related to the following verse (Quran 2:177) on fulfilling contracts. The 
Management as an agent is expected to manage the organization properly as part of the 
contract with the principal and employees are expected to provide their services to the 
organization. The Board of Directors are to assure that the organization is operating 
according to the intention of the shareholders while the Shariah Board ensures that the 
organization is running based on Shariah rules as well as to assure the shareholders 
that their investment is running in a permissible manner. As mentioned earlier, outside 
parties are also considered as stakeholders or interested parties of the organization and 
some have formal contractual obligations towards the organization. For instance, 
creditors are to ensure that goods are sufficiently and adequately supplied to the 
organization, funds are adequately and timely disbursed (in the case of trade financier), 
and the organization in turn have to ensure that commitments are duly paid. Debtors 
are to ensure that their debts are timely paid as to ensure smooth circulation of cash 
within the organization in order to meet its obligations towards other interested parties 
while the organization have to ensure that their customer received goods and services 
as promised either via contractual obligation or via their brand promise, advertisement, 
sales representatives, etc. Further, the organization has to ensure that it pays tax to the 
State so that the money can be channeled back to the society for development and 
observed all legal obligations to the State. Finally, for the society at large, the 
organization should contribute to the environment and to the needy as what had been 
done by many corporations especially the MNCs in preserving the environment and 
helping the needy via their CSR activities.   
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Righteousness is not that you turn your faces toward the east or the west, but 
(true) righteousness is (in) one who believes in Allah , the Last Day, the angels, 
the Book, and the prophets and gives wealth, in spite of love for it, to relatives, 
orphans, the needy, the traveler, those who ask (for help), and for freeing 
slaves; (and who) establishes prayer and gives zakah; (those who) fulfill the 
contracts which they have made; and (those who) are patient in poverty and 
hardship and during battle. Those are the ones who have been true, and it is 
those who are the righteous. 
(Quran 2:177) 
 
In relation to the concept of tawhid and achieving the objective of the divine law, we 
shall relate the responsibility of an agent towards the achievement of the Maqasid al-
Shariah as an ultimate goal of corporate governance (Al-Ghazali 1937, in Zulkifli 
Hassan 2008). Putting the pillars of Maqasid al-Shariah as the goal will give a wider 
spectrum of stakeholders to the agents, all of which are very important in ensuring that 
we continue to live in harmony in the present life and the hereafter. 
 
The concept of property rights in Islam was clearly listed as one of the pillars of Maqasid 
al-Shariah. Hifz al-Mal as it is known, clearly provides a comprehensive framework to 
identify, recognize, respect and protects interest and rights of every individual, 
community, the State and corporation. In Islam, Allah is the sole owner of all properties 
and human beings are trustees via the following verse (Quran 57:7). Human are given 
free access to acquire, use and dispose the property between humans in accordance to 
Shariah rules, but a portion to benefit from the property is also shared with the State 
and the society (Zamir Iqbal & Abbas Mirakhor, 2004). 
 
Believe in Allah and His Messenger (Muhammad SAW), and spend of that 
whereof He has made you trustees. And such of you as believe and spend (in 
Allah's Way), theirs will be a great reward.(Quran 57:7) 
 
4.0 CHALLENGES & THE ROOT CAUSE 
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Shariah Committee (SC) is given the advisory role in ensuring Shariah requirement is 
observed. SC is expected to give opinion in assuring compliance to Shariah to the Board 
of Directors, who bears the highest level of integrity in terms of Shariah compliant of an 
Islamic bank. Practically, as the SC is not stationed at the bank all the time, the Shariah 
Secretariat whom usually has knowledge in Usul Fiqh and Fiqh Muamalat shall be the 
first level of reference whereby they are to deliberate opinion on simple issues. Their 
deliberation will then be communicated to the SC. As for issues that are more 
complicated, it shall be communicated to the SC for research and deliberation. 
 
In order to ensure that the products conform to Shariah, SC needs to review the feature 
of the product, which can be of the following different type of concept as listed by 
Wahbah al-Zuhaili (2002 in Zulkifli Hassan 2009): 
 Bilateral contracts - Uqud Tamlikaat (contract of ownership), Uqud al-
Mua’wadhat (exchange), Uqud Isytirak (contract of partnership) i.e. Mudharabah 
(passive partnership) and Musyarakah (active partnership), Uqud Tawsiqat 
(contract of security) i.e. Kafalah (suretyship) and Rahnu (pledge), Uqud Itlaqat 
(contract pertaining to do a work) i.e. Wakalah (agency) and Hiwalah (debt 
transfer), Uqud Taqyiydat (contract of restriction), Uqud Hifz (contract of safe 
custody) and Wadiah (safekeeping) 
 Unilateral contracts - Isqatat (waiver), Ibra’ (rebate), Muqassah (setting-off 
debt), Wasiyyah (will), endownment and Qard (loan).  
 
4.1 SC as the subject matter expert 
 
BNM via Guidelines on the Governance of Shariah Committee for the Islamic Financial 
Institutions had outlined that a member of SC must be an expert of Usul Fiqh and Fiqh 
Muamalat. While it is very important to be an expert in Shariah, we cannot discount the 
importance of having knowledge in banking and finance as a whole. This is due to the 
fact that, according to Zainal Azam Abdul Rahman (2011), the operation of today’s 
Islamic banking industry is still confined within the conventional banking framework. 
Products developed are very much similar in substance and most of it is based on debt. 
As such, an SC should be mindful about the nature and original spirit of these products 
as it could have affecting the purity of Islamic products if it is not properly restructured 
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as Shariah-compliant. For instance, the Mudharabah deposits were structured to be an 
alternative product to fixed deposit (FD). While it was structured based on Mudharabah 
concept, return to the sahibul mal (depositor or investor) is still made as competitive as 
the FD and is short-term in nature. As such, it would pose greater risk to the IFI as the 
return to sahibul mal is based on floating rate while return from majority of their 
financing activities is based on fixed rate and long-term in nature. This finding is also 
noted via research done by Anouar Hassoune (2001), Abdel Hameed M Bashir 
(2000) and M Kabir Hassan and Abdel Hameed M Bashir (2002). Further, the Profit 
Equalization Reserve (PER) and Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) should be kept as a trust 
by the Islamic bank, not as part of shareholders’ equity as reported in the annual report 
due to the fact that banks cannot conveniently dip their hands into the funds for other 
use. 
 
An experienced SC member would see things from an end-to-end process. If there is 
amiss, they can effectively point out areas that had been left out. For example, while 
developing a new financing product, the marketing part of it had been unintentionally 
left out. An experienced SC member would be quick to realized that the marketing 
process had not been discussed as previously been. Therefore, he would be proactive in 
raising it to be discussed so that the marketing of the product is done ethically based on 
Shariah. On the other hand, if he is not as experienced, he would be less proactive and 
only use his expertise confining only to matters that had been laid before him to be 
discussed.  
 
A less experienced SC member would not know in detail how things work. For instance, 
a Bai’ al-Inah credit card should not only be perfected at the sale and buyback process 
but also the modes of doing the sale and buyback. Some banks confined to the written 
agreement to conclude the two contracts but certain banks however, are satisfied with 
verbal aqad. While both conducts is acceptable by the Shariah, SC should satisfy 
themselves on the mechanics of both types of contracts. In other word, Shariah risk 
mitigation should be embedded during the development stage itself. If SC is not as 
meticulous, they might miss out fundamental Shariah non-compliant issue like selling 
the same assets concurrently to different parties at the same time by different staff.   
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The focus should not only be on what to do but also how to do it and how to ensure it is 
done. Without proper exposure to the system especially in complicated financial 
instruments, there is a risk that deliberation by SC may not be complete. It is easier 
nowadays that computerized system can assist in detecting and preventing Shariah risk. 
As per the previous example, the system can recommend assets that could be used for 
the Bai’ al-Inah transactions avoiding different personnel to use them at the same time 
or worse, selling assets that had been sold off for good. Nevertheless, without knowing 
such Shariah-compliant risk in the first place, detective and preventive rules would not 
be proposed to be included in the system. 
 
As per our discussion so far, it is very important that members of SC should have 
knowledge and experience in the banking industry in order to critically analyze the 
products and processes so that their advisory role is a value added service that covers 
end-to-end process. The question now is whether the fast developed Islamic banking 
industry has sufficient number of capable Shariah scholars to be appointed as SC 
member? Wright (2006) quoted that there is no shortage of Shariah scholars in this 
world as qualifications in Shariah and Islamic jurisprudence are offered widely across 
the world. The challenge is to find such scholars that also have knowledge and 
experience in finance and banking. This is not a new issue to the industry. While young 
scholars are produced, there had been many discussions all over the world on the 
capability of them becoming SC members.  
 
According to Wilson (2009), Hennie van Greuning & Zamir Iqbal (2008) and Hanim 
Hamzah (2010), shortage of quality SC members is a problem for IFIs in achieving its 
objectives and gaining respect from stakeholders. Therefore, some of the IFIs in the GCC 
took the advantage of appointing prominent Shariah scholars as their SC member. This 
would add value in terms of Shariah branding and at the same time giving confidence to 
their stakeholders. However, it was also argued that this measure had opened another 
floodgate whereby prominent Shariah scholars had been appointed to many SC. The 
issue had been reported by Reuters (2010a) and Dana El Baltaji & Haris Anwar 
(2010) whereby the top 20 scholars serve 621 boards globally. Questions were raised 
on whether these scholars could cope with the sheer load of responsibilities in many SC 
across many countries especially at certain level of age and serving institutions that are 
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robustly developed and need a very close attention. There are also calls for the industry 
to limit number of boards that a scholar can serve. However, Mr Yusuf Talal DeLorenzo 
had counter-argued that strength of a person is subjective and varies from one person 
to another (Rushdi Siddiqui 2010). Even time devoted to accomplish a certain task 
differs between an experienced scholar and a junior scholar. As such, it is unfair to judge 
a person’s capability based on our own capability. Apart from this, there is also 
skepticism raised by certain parties, notably Nadirsyah Hosen (in Greg Fealy & Sally 
White 2008), Foster (2009) and Mabid Ali Al-Jarhi (2010) that this may indicate the 
leniency of the scholars and they are appointed since they can accommodate to the 
needs of the IFIs. To a worse extend, their appointment had been connected to fatwa 
shopping by the IFIs. Nevertheless, Sheikh Nizam Yaquby refuted that the situation was 
exaggerated and these accusations are not based on solid ground. Banks are 
increasingly want the best out of their Shariah scholars and fatwa shopping is not an 
option (Reuters 2010b).  
 
Dr Nedal Alchaar raise his concern on a potential conflict of interest or competitiveness 
risk resulting from information leakage if number of local IFI served by a particular 
scholar is not limited (Dana El Baltaji & Haris Anwar 2010). In Malaysia however, IFIs 
have to follow strict regulations of BNM in appointing SC members. Scholars serving a 
local bank or appointed as SAC member of BNM cannot serve as an SC member of 
another bank. This is to control conflict of interest and confidentiality issues that may 
arise between banks. Perhaps, the hikmah behind this rule is giving the opportunity for 
young scholars to serve as SC members. However, Sheikh Hussain Hamid Hassan 
counter-argued that conflict of interest issue should not arise among the scholars as 
they are governed strictly by the Shariah (Rushdi Siddiqui 2010).  
 
While it is a noble effort by BNM to introduce such regulations, it would be good if each 
IFIs were to have at least one senior scholar as their SC member and the rest of the 
junior scholars can learn from them. This would be a more effective succession plan of 
scholars. Despite the regulation and the fact that most of quality local scholars are 
taken, it is still plausible for IFIs to have a senior scholar as their SC member by 
appointing qualified foreign scholars. The regulations however does not limit on 
number of foreign boards that this scholar is representing.    
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4.2 Capacity of SC to ensure that Shariah is observed 
 
As we can see from the Shariah Governance Framework, it is clear that the SC only have 
the Shariah Secretariat reporting to them. SC and Shariah Secretariat could within their 
capacity issue judgment on the permissibility of the business. They however, do not 
have the capacity to assure the Board of Directors and the stakeholders that business 
had been carried in a permissible manner. Let us revisit the case of Bai’ al-Inah credit 
card. 
 
As previously mentioned, banks may conclude the Bai’ al-Inah contracts in writing or 
verbally. While both are acceptable, the issue now boils down on whether the contracts 
had been properly concluded. In other word, since this is a sell and buyback agreement 
in facilitating the credit limit of the credit card, customers may wonder as to why they 
need to conclude such contracts since their intention is to get a credit card. It is crucial 
for contracting parties to have a proper intention i.e. buy and sellback or sell and 
buyback if they do not want to invalidate the contract (Saiful Azhar Rosly & Mahmood 
Sanusi, 2001). Therefore, it is up to the officer attending the customer to properly 
explain on the transactions so that the customer have a pure view about Islamic 
financing, not as a hilah for a riba in disguised transactions. Further, the signing of the 
contracts must be in proper order or the verbal contract is properly done. While these 
had been explicitly outlined in the product manual, the issue would be how could the SC 
satisfy themselves and others that such verbal aqad had been properly conducted? 
Practically, SC members are non-executive members of the bank and the Shariah 
Secretariat is not sanctioned to conduct such verification.  
 
Even with limited resources, SC is made to assure stakeholders in the annual report that 
business was conducted by IFIs in accordance to the Shariah. Rationale for this 
assurance is the credibility in assuring permissibility lies with the scholars (Wilson 
2009) whom have the utmost knowledge in Shariah within the IFI. Nevertheless, the 
central issue is still on limited resources and their assurance is only partial and 
questionable. This is due to the fact that they do not have direct access to other sections 
of the governance that could have direct contact with the operation such as internal 
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audit and risk management. Questions may rise on whether the SC has been given 
appropriate authority to ensure compliance to the Shariah is observed or they are just a 
reference for Shariah matter and a mere product approving body.  
 
4.3 SC’s proficiency and familiarity with legal terms 
 
Based on Section 20 (b) and (c) of GPS1 issued by BNM, SC is expected to endorse and 
validate all relevant documentations and this includes the term and condition, the 
product manual, marketing advertisement, sales illustration and brochures used to 
describe the product. SC have to meticulously vet and endorse all documents involved 
including the terms and conditions contained in the proposal forms, legal 
documentations product manuals, marketing materials like advertisements, sales 
illustrations, brochures and so on. They should be able to read the fine prints and items 
hidden between the lines. 
 
As most of the banking documentations are in English, SC members are expected to be 
proficient in English apart from Arabic. However, if the documents are printed in 
multiple languages especially advertising materials, it is not necessary for them to know 
all other languages but they should ensure that there is a disclaimer whereby in the 
event of conflict of information between the documents, the version which they 
thoroughly checked should prevail. 
 
Apart from being proficient in English, the SC members may also require to be familiar 
with the terms, jargons and writing style of legal documentations. If the product is 
developed from scratch based on Shariah, issues arising from the legal documentation 
may not be as serious as the documentation is been developed based on the concept. 
The issues arise when the original conventional product is being converted into Shariah 
compliant product whereby terms might have changed but the spirit and the nature of 
the transaction may not reflect the true Shariah-compliant documentation. It may sound 
easy as majority of products in Malaysia is based on Bay concept or Uqud Tamlikaat but 
one size does not necessarily fits all. As such, checking of the documentations should be 
beyond the proper use of terminology and avoidance of certain taboo words like 
interest, repayment, borrower, and so on but it should be understood that trading is 
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absolutely different kind of transaction from money renting. For instance, it is a practice 
of banks to have a facility agreement or an offer letter to state the summary of financing 
prior to the conclusion of legal documentations. The issue would be, would this be 
acceptable to have such document detailing the tenure, profit rate, financing sum and 
instalment amount for a Bai al-Inah financing since it is a standard practice of a 
conventional counter product?   
 
Certain banks are very strict in terms of documentation and imposed that the 
documentation used by the lawyers must be procured from them. Others are somehow 
flexible whereby lawyers can draft their own documentations. As such, it would be 
difficult for the bank to control the contents of the documentations. Whichever method 
applied, IFIs should be mindful that lapses preparation of documents may result in 
implementation of the contract not as intended. Previous cases like Affin Bank vs 
Zulkifli Abdullah (2006) had taught us how the lack of Shariah structuring in financing 
(or rather refinancing) documentations, which should have taken a different approach 
from conventional financing, had lead us to court. 
 
4.4 Effectiveness of the Shariah audit framework 
 
The only party that has the capacity and capability of checking on the implementation of 
Shariah requirements within the framework is internal audit. With strict guidelines on 
auditors as imposed by their strong fraternity, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), 
reliance can be place upon them in ensuring that the Shariah guidelines are followed. 
Nevertheless, two main issues remained questionable. 
 
Firstly, most auditors in the financial institutions are trained in finance, conventional 
finance to be exact. Since not many of them had been formally trained in Fiqh Muamalat 
or Usul Fiqh, their knowledge in Islamic finance is very limited. The focus may still be 
based on risk and little emphasize would be put on compliance to Shariah, as a branch 
of compliance risk. As such, outcome of their audit may be questionable whether their 
coverage had been rigorous enough to cover all aspects of Shariah concerns.  
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While it is important for Shariah auditors to have knowledge in Fiqh Muamalat and Usul 
Fiqh, let us not forget that it is equally important that the auditors are equipped with 
necessary skills in performing audit. The author’s finding is similar to those finding by 
Wafik Grais & Matteo Pellegrini (2006) and Shahul Hameed Mohamed Ibrahim 
(2008), whereby background in either Shariah or auditing alone is not sufficient in 
conducting Shariah audit. For instance, looking at the Bai’ al-Inah credit card 
highlighted before, the contract can be concluded in writing or verbally. If it is in 
writing, the evidence can be physically sighted. It is not sufficient to just sight the 
documents but to also check on the performance of the contract. This is where the 
sampling skill of an auditor comes into action. However, if the contract is concluded 
verbally, it would be challenging for the checking of the performance of the contract. 
Phone recordings of the contract have to be traced among thousands, if not millions of 
phone calls of the bank and it have to be matched with all the contracts that is being 
examined. This is where the auditing skills kicks-in whereby it is neither impossible nor 
difficult for an experienced auditor to trace such contracts.   
 
It can be argued that auditors can work together with the Shariah Secretariat and the SC 
to accomplish their goal. This would however pose the second issue i.e. whether they 
can have adequate access to the Shariah Secretariat and SC, and vice versa. Without 
formal connection between the auditors and the SC, it would be challenging for the 
auditors to procure their expertise. Further, there is no absolute reporting line between 
the auditors and the SC, there is a possibility that their observation on Shariah issues 
would not be effectively communicated to the SC. In this case, even if the auditors are 
adequately competent in Shariah and independent in their reporting, there is no 
guarantee that there will be no gap or filters between their findings and the SC. 
Therefore, there is a possibility whereby in certain cases, the auditors may not be able 
to assure the Board on performance of a product is in accordance to the Shariah but at 
the same time the SC may assure the stakeholders that everything is in order, despite 
their limitations as previously discussed.  
 
4.5 SC’s position within the Governance structure 
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In the Governance framework, the SC has the Shariah oversight accountability on 
Shariah related matters to the Board whom in turn having the overall oversight on the 
Shariah governance structure and Shariah compliance. The Board also has the Board 
Audit Committee and the Board Risk Management Committee, which consist certain 
members of the Board to support them in the Governance structure. Although having a 
direct access to the Board, the SC does not have a say at the Board level. Further, they 
may not have access to issues pertaining to Shariah compliance and risk highlighted by 
the internal auditors or the risk managers.  
 
Although the Shariah Secretariat directly reports to the SC and have the function to 
conduct research and review on Shariah, the effectiveness of the Shariah Secretariat  is 
questionable as they are not required to undertake specialized training in doing 
rigorous audits and reviews as the internal auditors had went through. On top of that, 
the Management may see that the Shariah Secretariat reports to the SC, a “lesser level” 
committee as compared to the reporting matrix of the internal audit. Therefore, access 
to certain level of information in doing their review may be limited.    
 
Some might argue that since the SC member is paid by the IFIs, their level of 
independency may be impaired. They may want the management to be pleased with 
them and keep employing them. As such, they may be lenient on certain issues 
pertaining to the Shariah. This had lead to what is termed by Mahmoud El-Gamal 
(2006) as Shariah arbitrage. Wilson (2009) however counter-argued that there is little 
evidence of such arbitrage in practice, and indeed it could be regarded as implausible 
that the sort of bank clients or investors wanting Shariah compliance would shop 
around for the least restrictive fatwa. The author is of the same opinion with the 
counter-argument by comparing the structure with internal audit and risk management. 
These professions are required to be independent from the Management in order to 
assist the organization in achieving its objectives. Further, the Shariah scholars are 
believers and they are to answer to the higher authority in the afterlife if they do not 
discharge their responsibility in a proper manner. 
 
Zulkifli Hassan (2009) commented that the SC does not have standard guidelines in 
discharging their responsibilities. It is based on the practice whereby the Shariah 
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Secretariat will hand over materials to be reviewed or deliberated and the outcome 
shall be delivered. Their role is more on advisory rather than assurance, despite their 
comments in the annual report in assuring the stakeholders on the permissibility of the 
IFIs operation. 
 
Finally, the issue of mere compliance inherited via the corporate governance may pose a 
problem in achieving the objective of the Shariah governance. People had find ways to 
achieve the requirements of the corporate governance but not the objective of it. 
Therefore, in a number of cases, corporate governance had failed to properly function. 
 
5.0 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
BNM had done a very good job in coming up with guidelines for IFIs in order to control 
their operations while giving the credibility to grow further. It is certainly a boost to the 
industry to gain respect and to be more resilient. Nevertheless, as the industry move 
into the next stage of its life cycle, certainly there are things that can be improved. This 
section shall forward some of the recommendations in order to address issues as 
highlighted above. 
 
5.1 Slight change to the Governance structure  
 
As highlighted, issues raised to the Board of Audit Committee and Board of Risk 
Management pertaining Shariah audit and Shariah risk may not surface to the SC. It is 
important for SC to know what is happening within the organization because end of the 
day, they are the ones to sign off the annual report in assuring the stakeholders on the 
compliancy of the institution. As such, it would be a bold move for BNM to make it 
mandatory for banks to appoint at least one members of the SC as a member of the 
Board, Board of Internal Audit and Board of Risk Management. By doing this, issues 
highlighted are effectively and directly communicated to the SC. This would also give 
them opportunity to give opinions and have a say in the Board meeting on issues 
pertaining Shariah. This would enable them to be closer to the organization rather than 
merely playing an advisory role. 
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Each members of the SC appointed to various Boards is to have the responsibility to 
report back to other members of SC during the SC meeting. The members should sit 
more frequently as to brief each other on the happenings of the institution.  
 
Another alternative would be for the Chief Internal Auditor (CIA) and the Chief Risk 
Officer (CRO) to have a session with SC before the Board of Audit Committee and Board 
of Risk Management meeting. This would ensure issues pertaining to Shariah compliant 
and risk are communicated to the SC. Subsequent to the Board meetings, extract of the 
minutes on Shariah matters are to be circulated to the SC for their information. 
Concerns by the SC on Shariah compliant and risk are to be compiled and 
communicated to the respective board via CIA and CRO. Outcomes of the deliberations 
by the Boards are to be followed closely by the Company Secretary and communicated 
to the SC.   
 
Finally, another alternative would be to require SC members and the Shariah Secretariat 
to be in attendance during all Board, Board Audit Committee and Board Risk 
Management meetings. The SC members would have a better picture about the ex-post 
implementation of Shariah rulings. All the Boards would also have the opportunity to 
consult the SC member on Shariah matters on the spot.  
 
5.2 Appointment of SC member 
 
BNM can consider relaxing the regulation of appointing Shariah scholars to SC of 
multiple banks. Perhaps for a start, BNM can allow Shariah scholars who are not on 
BNM’s SAC to be on SC of maximum two banks. This would encourage local banks to get 
local senior scholars as their SC member and act as mentor to the junior scholars, in line 
with the comment made by Amr Mohamed El Tiby (2011) whereby transfer of 
knowledge to the next generation should be given priority. This practice would be 
market driven whereby senior scholars would not only act as mentor to add value on 
bank’s governance but their goodwill will add value in terms of reputation of the banks. 
 
In order for scholars to complement each other in terms of knowledge, it would be wise 
for IFIs to appoint scholars of different background such as legal, finance, economics, 
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etc. While their core competency is in Shariah, having an exposure or a second 
competency in another field would be an added advantage. This would reduce the risk 
in documentation, structuring the financial products, and so on.  
 
Finally, BNM can also initiate an international certification for scholars before they are 
deemed fit to serve the IFIs. BNM can take the accounting or legal profession as a guide 
whereby scholars are to have certain level of education before allowing them to sit for 
professional exam. Exams are based on application of knowledge whereby their 
expertise is put to test in problem solving. In order to keep them abreast with the 
development of the industry, they are required to attend certified trainings, seminars or 
conferences and part of their continuation of professional development is to give 
lectures in seminars or to contribute researched articles on the industry.    
 
5.3 Strengthening the Shariah audit function 
 
In line with the certification of the scholars, Shariah auditors should also be certified. 
Certification can come from a joint effort between champions in Islamic financial 
training and the audit fraternity. For instance, certification issued by IIA and INCEIF 
would give a high credibility to the auditors as both institutions are champions in their 
own industry. Perhaps the modules should cover Muamalat, finance, accounting, law 
and so on. Candidates that have basic qualification in any module would be exempted 
from taking the module. Level of the certification would vary to show level of 
competency of the member. For instance, member who had just passed all papers would 
be conferred with basic membership and until he satisfies a certain level of experience 
as Shariah auditor in a bank, then he would be conferred to a higher level membership. 
Membership fees are to be maintained by members as to be channeled for the purpose 
of research in Shariah auditing. And like the scholars, members have to maintain certain 
amount of CPD points in order to keep them abreast with the development of the 
industry. In order to maximize their internal resources, Shariah auditors should be 
given free access to the Shariah Secretariat and the SC as a point of reference.  
 
With the certification, BNM can start to market the expertise to overseas. Malaysia can 
be a hub of Shariah auditing experts where there is a large pool of competent talents. It 
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can be extended whereby BNM can start granting license for individuals operating 
Shariah auditing firms and again Malaysia can be an outsourcing hub for Shariah 
auditing. 
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of corporate governance is actually embedded in Islam whereby the 
company’s movements towards achieving its objective is properly and systematically 
guided and controlled in order to meet and protect stakeholders’ rights and objectives. 
Stakeholder does not only limited to worldly forms but extended towards the concept of 
tawhid and the oneness of God. One does not only answerable or responsible towards 
another living being but also to the higher authority, Allah. In achieving the objective of 
the divine law, we shall relate the responsibility of an agent towards the achievement of 
the Maqasid al-Shariah as an ultimate goal of corporate governance to ensure that we 
continue to live in harmony in the present life and the hereafter. 
 
There are certain numbers of people still skeptical about Islamic finance due to reasons 
that can be traced back to lack of strong governance. It is due to challenges faced by 
Shariah governance, particularly the Shariah Committee (SC) and the Shariah audit, 
which had lead to negative comments on the industry. It was also noted that Shariah 
auditing was not seriously taken in Malaysian IFIs, calling for crucial development of 
comprehensive Shariah auditing framework.  
 
BNM had outlined that a member of SC must be an expert of Usul Fiqh and Fiqh 
Muamalat. However, we cannot discount the importance of having knowledge in 
banking and finance as a whole. Shortage of quality SC members is a problem for IFIs in 
achieving its objectives and gaining respect from stakeholders. Therefore, some of the 
IFIs in the GCC took the advantage of appointing prominent Shariah scholars as their SC 
member, which would add value in terms of Shariah branding and giving confidence to 
their stakeholders. Another issue would be the capability of SC to have an oversight on 
Shariah compliance due to lack of resources in Shariah auditing and risk management. 
Thirdly, the issue revolves around their proficiency in English and familiarity with the 
terms, jargons and writing style of legal documentations. Checking of the 
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documentations should be thorough and beyond the proper use of terminology and 
avoidance of certain taboo words and realign trading away from money renting. The 
next issue highlighted is on the knowledge of Shariah auditors in Fiqh Muamalat and 
their access to the SC. The author calls for the gap to be bridged and certification made 
for competent auditors.   
  
It is important for SC to know what is happening within the organization because end of 
the day, they are the ones to sign off the annual report in assuring the stakeholders on 
the compliancy of the institution. As such, it is recommended that at least one members 
of the SC is appointed as a member of the Board, Board of Internal Audit and Board of 
Risk Management so that issues highlighted are effectively and directly communicated 
to the SC. The author further suggested for regulation in appointing Shariah scholars to 
SC of multiple banks to be relaxed. This would encourage local banks to get local senior 
scholars as their SC member and act as mentor to the junior scholars.  
 
As a caution to the readers, this paper was not written based on extensive scientific 
research and employing rigorous methodology in concluding the findings. The author 
regrouped previous findings and added in his own observation on Shariah governance 
which was experienced during his days as an auditor of a local Islamic bank. While no 
current primary research had been conducted for this paper, it may somehow give loose 
and outdated remarks on his findings if it has been effectively corrected. Perhaps future 
research in this area can address this shortcoming and it would also be a good 
exploration in commercializing Shariah audit. 
 
Allah knows best, Wallahu a’lam. 
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